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Abstract 
The fiscal policy rule implicit in the Stability and Growth Pact, 
has been rationalised as a way to ensure that national fiscal 
policies remain sustainable within the EU, thereby endorsing the 
independence of the ECB. We empirically examine the 
sustainability of European fiscal policies over the period 
1970-2001. The intertemporal government budget constraint 
provides a test based on the cointegration relation between 
government revenues, expenditures and interest payments. 
Sustainability is analysed at both the national level and for a 
European panel. Results show that European fiscal policy has 
been sustainable overall, yet national experiences differ 
considerably. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The consolidation of public finances has somehow slid back on the priority list of European 
economic policy since the start of EMU. Debt ratios have stabilised – if not, started to rise again – 
in recent years (see Fig. 1). The dilution of the deficit rule in the Stability and Growth Pact is just 
one indicator of the fatigue in carrying on fiscal consolidation. This evolution should not come as a 
surprise now that national governments have secured entry into EMU. Even if the main legacy of 
the Pact is probably that of having increased public awareness of fiscal sustainability, the 
numerical targets of the Treaty of Maastricht and the provisions of the Pact do not adequately act as 
a ‘stick’ to force optimal policies that are based upon the use of automatic stabilisers around 
sustainable fiscal positions. Another interpretation, however, is that governments are fiscally lax as 
budget constraints are weaker within monetary union. Basically, the disciplinary effect of higher 
interest rates does not bite national fiscal policy as much when interest rates are set centrally. This 
distortion leads to excessive debt accumulation and higher interest rates across the monetary union 
(Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1999). Keeping in order the national fiscal houses is not a sufficient 
condition to eliminate these effects. Deficit rules address this free riding problem only indirectly. It 
is only a negative coordination mechanism for debt consolidation. Instead, it is the no-bailout 
clause – enshrined in Articles 101 and 103 of the Treaty of Nice – that is crucial in disciplining 
national fiscal policies. Essentially, the clause prohibits overdraft facilities from the ECB or the 
assumption of national commitments by other Member States, and thus separates responsibilities 
between the various national fiscal policies. The revision of the Pact has severely dented the 
reputation of intergovernmental renegotiations. In addition, the political and economic cohesion of 
monetary union may require fiscal support across regions. At present, the bailout scenario seems 
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remote, but cannot be excluded as an option . There is indeed some evidence that market discipline 
does not function in the European bond markets. EMU Member States pay markedly lower default 
premia on outstanding debt (see Bernoth et al., 2004). Paradoxally, the fiscal relations between EU 
Member States may have become more closely tied across borders since the breakdown of the Pact. 
 
Consequently, tests of sustainability on each national fiscal policy turn out to be less insightful. The 
overall sustainability of public finances in monetary union should be tested instead. We propose a 
simple test for sustainability that is based on excluding Ponzi games as a viable option of 
government finance. By ruling out ad infinitum borrowing to cover interest payments on 
outstanding debt, the government budget constraint implies a cointegration relation between real 
government expenditures, revenues and net interest payments. Analysing this relationship for each 
European government’s fiscal policy is awkward because of small sample problems. An 
examination of the overall fiscal position of European governments with panel techniques 
precisely allow us to overcome this problem. A panel test for aggregate sustainability is also 
consistent with the independent setting of national fiscal policies. 
 
In section 2, we present a specification of the intertemporal government budget constraint in order 
to derive some alternative testing strategies of fiscal sustainability, and particularly the use of 
cointegration. The sustainability hypothesis is then tested in section 3, first at the national level, 
then for the European panel. We check whether the assumptions underlying our testing procedure 
hold, and accordingly discuss some extensions of the panel test. Finally, section 4 concludes and 
offers suggestions for future research. 
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2. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES OF TESTING SUSTAINABILITY 
 
We start the discussion from the flow government budget constraint (FGBC henceforth). The 
period-by-period budget constraint simply defines total debt Dt  as the accumulation due to 
interest payments on past fiscal imbalances and primary net lending S t , including seigniorage 
revenues received from the central bank: 
Dt ≡ 1 + rtDt−1 + St
     (1) 
Under the assumption that real interest rates rt  are positive (for all t ), this can be presented as an 
unstable non-homogeneous difference equation. Solving the identity (1) forward yields the 
intertemporal government budget constraint (IGBC henceforth): 
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The government complies with this constraint when the sum of the present discounted value of 
expected future primary surpluses just suffices to pay off current debt. In other words, the 
sustainability condition is met when the public sector does not hold public assets or need to alienate 
liabilities with any positive probability. Testing the sustainability of fiscal policy thus reduces to 
testing the hypothesis that the transversality condition holds: 
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In a stochastic environment, observable fiscal indicators can render tests of the transversality 
condition highly misleading. To illustrate this, suppose interest rates on government bonds were 
smaller than the rate of economic growth. Prolonged periods with primary deficits do not indicate 
an unsustainable fiscal position per se. In such a dynamically inefficient economy, the IGBC is in 
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fact irrelevant as debt can be rolled over indefinitely. But if the interest rate were to surpass the 
GDP growth rate with some positive probability, even zero primary surpluses would become 
unsustainable. One needs to look for an adequate test of the IGBC that is not only robust to 
time-variant interest rates but also to different debt management policies and the implications of 
uncertainty and risk aversion. 
 
One such test is suggested by Trehan and Walsh (1991). They prove that a stationary 
quasi-difference of debt is sufficient for the transversality condition to hold, if and only if debt and 
the primary surplus are cointegrated. Artis and Marcellino (1998) generally find such cointegration 
relations for all European countries. However, Bravo and Silvestre (2002), among others find 
no-cointegration of expenditure and revenue ratios in several EU countries. A stationary linear 
combination of debt and primary surplus is rejected by Trehan and Walsh (1991) for the US. 
Quintos (1995) and Ahmed and Rogers (1995) show that cointegration between non-stationary 
government expenditures G t , revenues T t  and net interest payments rtDt−1  is a necessary 
condition for the present value constraint to be satisfied if these series are at most integrated of 
order one and some weak economic assumptions hold. The latter require: (a) agents to hold rational 
expectations; (b) utility of consumption to follow a random walk; and (c) the covariance of 
marginal rates of substitution in consumption with fiscal variables to be time-invariant.1 As a 
consequence, total net lending of the government tS
~
 is stationary: 
.
~
1−+−= ttttt DrTGS       (4) 
                                                 
1
 Hakkio and Rush (1991) derive a test for cointegration under similar assumptions, but require in addition that real 
interest rates are stationary. On quarterly US data, they reject cointegration between spending and revenues. Haug 
(1990) examines a short quarterly sample from 1960 to 1987, and still concludes the IGBC holds. Quintos (1995) finds 
cointegration, but for a value of ω  smaller than one which suggests weak sustainability only. 
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Conversely, cointegration is also a sufficient condition under the auxiliary assumptions (a)-(c) and 
for a very general class of time series processes for debt (Ahmed and Rogers, 1995). It is sufficient 
that debt is at most integrated of order one. Thus, the limit term being zero implies the sum of 
current and expected discounted future government expenditures and revenues are set such as to 
equal the amount needed to repay principal and interest on debt.2 
With an unspecified cointegrating vector, only weak sustainability can be said to hold. This implies 
the undiscounted debt process is exploding at a rate less than the economy’s growth rate. In 
contrast, strong sustainability implies that the undiscounted public debt is finite in the long run. 
This occurs if the total government net lending series is stationary, or when government revenues, 
spending and interest payments are cointegrated, with cointegrating vector equal to  
β
′
= 1,−1, 1   #   
       (5) 
The concept underlying cointegration is similar to the stabilising reaction of the primary surplus to 
public debt. In this ‘fiscal rule’, policy adjusts to deviations from the present value constraint in a 
similar way as primary surpluses react to shocks to the path of debt (Bohn, 1998). 
 
How realistic is it to test the implication of the IGBC that the present discounted value of primary 
surpluses equals current debt? After all, the discussion is limited to a pure time series analysis of 
sustainability, and there may simply not be enough memory in the historical DGP of fiscal data to 
infer upon concepts that hold at infinite horizons (Hansen et al., 1991; Canzoneri et al., 2001). 
Analyses that involve policy simulations and fiscal forecasts are not considered, even if they may 
be more relevant from a policy point of perspective. Solvency is essentially a forward-looking 
                                                 
2
 Bohn (1998) contends that cointegration is a necessary condition for sustainability. Such conditions only apply if the 
fiscal variables follow an I(1) process but this restriction need to be justified on economic grounds. 
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concept where policy shifts may perturb any definite conclusion on the basis of past policy 
conduct. While this is an inference problem that plagues any empirical analysis, the problem of 
small samples also induces some econometric problems, since unit root and cointegration tests 
have well known small sample bias. This has been avoided by using century-long samples of fiscal 
policy in the United States (Ahmed and Rogers, 1995; Bohn, 2005), the United Kingdom (Ahmed 
and Rogers, 1995) or Portugal (Marinheiro, 2006). But for the majority of European countries, 
yearly fiscal data are only available over limited time spans. This partly explains the rather 
inconclusive results of many of these studies: it is easy to cite a variety of studies for the same 
country that find conflicting results.3 Evidence in Afonso (2005) based on cointegration tests 
illustrates the smal sample problem for a comprehensive set of countries.4 The recent literature on 
cointegration in macro-panels is a first step towards  jointly examine sustainability of European 
fiscal policies. 
 
3. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF SUSTAINABILITY OF EU FISCAL POLICIES 
 
3.1. DATASET 
 
We construct annual data on real government expenditures (G t ), real government revenues (T t ) 
and real net interest payments (rtDt−1 ) for 14 European countries, all of which are subject to the 
Stability or Convergence Programmes of the European Commission. The dataset comprehends all 
                                                 
3
 Corsetti and Roubini (1991), Artis and Marcellino (1998), Bravo and Silvestre (2002) or Arghyrou and Luintel 
(2005), for example. 
4
 Afonso (2005) gives an excellent detailed overview of the various approaches for testing sustainability, and also 
provides a comprehensive list of empirical studies. 
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all the EU-countries, with the exception of Luxembourg and the New Member States. The data 
source is the OECD Economic Outlook and span the period 1970-2001 or a subsample thereof. All 
current and investment outlays are included in government expenditures. Net interest payments are 
not calculated as in the theoretical cointegration vector (4), but we experiment with two different 
measures instead. The first one contains net interest payments on outstanding government debt. 
The second one takes into account all government capital transactions. This seems a more realistic 
approximation of smooth debt management policies. All data are measured in undiscounted real 
levels. This follows immediately from the necessary conditions for the existence of a cointegration 
relationship between G t  , T t  and rtDt−1 . 
 
In the initial empirical analysis, we merely replicate existing evidence on the sustainability of fiscal 
policy in single European countries with cointegration tests on the IGBC, and unit root tests on the 
primary surplus and debt to GDP ratios. These results serve as input for the panel unit root and 
panel cointegration tests on sustainability. As panel tests are only valid under the stringent 
assumptions of identical cointegrating rank and the absence of cross-sectional dependence or 
cointegration, we briefly test these hypotheses.  
 
3.2. TESTING SUSTAINABILITY OF NATIONAL FISCAL POLICY 
 
In order to initiate the cointegration analysis, we need to establish the order of integration of the 
different series. We perform ADF and KPSS-tests for level and trend stationarity for the basic 
series: government expenditures, revenues and net interest payments. Results are displayed in 
Table 1. While we can never reject a unit root for expenditures or revenues, net interest payments 
seem to be stationary in most European countries. In Austria, Spain, Finland, Greece and Portugal, 
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however, net interest payments evolve smoothly along a trend. For the other countries, the 
Treasury seems to smooth debt payments over time.  
 
Before testing the cointegrating relationship in (4) as such, we also wanted to impose the unity 
cointegration coefficients from theory, as in (5). We thus calculated total net lending as in (4), but 
now expressed as a ratio to GDP, and performed the same unit root tests. Stationarity of total 
government net lending should be an equivalent necessary condition for the IGBC to hold. As 
Table 2 shows, sustainability would be violated for at least half of the EU member states. These 
include the countries with high debt ratios as Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, but also 
countries with rather volatile fiscal policies as Austria and Spain. These mixed results are 
illustrative of the various findings in the literature. They also indicate already that cointegration 
may be difficult to fit to some countries.5 
 
Explicit tests of the cointegration relation (4) are performed in a VAR specified on the three fiscal 
variables. A constant – that is constrained to lie in the cointegrating space – is allowed for so as to 
permit government debt to converge to some constant positive value. The tests for weak 
sustainability are the Johansen Max and Trace variants. We determine the number of lags in the 
system on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. The resulting cointegrating ranks are 
reported in Table 3. We also impose a unity cointegrating rank for all countries, and the implied 
cointegration vectors estimated in the corresponding VEC are reported in Table 4.  
There seems to be no evidence at all for a cointegration relation in the Netherlands. Evidence is less 
                                                 
5
 Likewise, a simple unit root test on the public debt ratio only further demonstrates the inconclusiveness of 
sustainability tests on national fiscal policies. Now, we find the debt ratio to be stationary in Germany, Spain, Finland, 
France, Sweden, but also Italy. 
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clear-cut in the case of Spain, Greece and Portugal, however, as the Max test prefers a zero 
cointegrating rank. These results are consistent with the unit root test on real total net lending for 
the latter countries. Sustainability should thus be rejected for a couple of European countries, but 
public finances are not problematic in most EU Member States. The implied cointegrating vectors 
seem overall reasonable. There is some heterogeneity around the theoretically negative unity 
coefficient on real government revenues. The coefficient on net interest payments does never show 
the expected unity coefficient – with the exception of Ireland – and in many cases even displays a 
negative coefficient. 
 
The basic conclusions from both sets of results are the following: (a) there is a core group of 
countries where sustainability of public finances does not seem to be guaranteed. These include 
Spain, the Netherlands, Greece and Portugal; (b) in some other countries with notably loose fiscal 
stance (Austria, Belgium, Italy), non-stationarity of the implied total net lending is not always 
rejected; (c) the cointegration vectors implied by weak sustainability are in line with the theoretical 
relationship between government expenditures, revenues and net interest payments.  
 
3.3. THE EUROPEAN PANEL TEST 
 
In order to set out the cointegration analysis, we first need to establish the order of integration of 
the different series. As national fiscal policies vary considerably, we definitely need to allow for 
substantial heterogeneity in the panel analysis. We simply model this with heterogeneous fixed 
effects and trends across countries. We consider two types of panel unit root tests, and compute 
both the tests of Levin and Lin (2002), and the ADF-test of Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). The latter 
allows for heterogeneous autocorrelation under the alternative hypothesis. Results are reported in 
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Table 5. As could be expected from the national analyses, none of the tests rejects a unit root for 
real government expenditures and revenues. For net interest payments, only the Levin-Lin 
ADF-test is unable to reject a unit root. These results should nevertheless be interpreted with 
caution. First, both Levin-Lin and IPS tests are derived under the assumption of balanced panels, 
whereas we used unbalanced ones. Second, there may be important comovements across the 
national series. This will be examined further in section 3.4. 
 
We then continue to test the cointegration relation (4) for the full panel of European countries. As 
was evident from the national cointegration relations, there is more support for the weak version 
that displays substantially different coefficients (see Table 4). We therefore apply the 
residual-based method of Pedroni (1997) that incorporates a lot of heterogeneity through 
heterogeneous fixed effects, slope coefficients and deterministic trends across countries. Results 
are summarised in Table 6. In the unbalanced panel of 14 countries, the null of no cointegration can 
be safely rejected at a significance level of at least 5%. Only the panel ADF-test statistic gives 
contrary evidence, but we would prefer to attach more importance to the group tests as these allow 
for heterogeneity in the persistence of the residuals. It thus seems that sustainability is guaranteed 
for the ensemble of European governments. 
 
3.4. DO THE ASSUMPTIONS HOLD? 
 
All of the asymptotic properties of the panel stationarity test statistics have been derived under two 
rather stringent assumptions that are hard to bring about in empirical exercises (Banerjee et al., 
2005).  
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ASSUMPTION 1:is the order of cointegration identical across countries? 
As was already evident from the national tests in Table 3, the order of cointegration differs across 
countries. In order to check whether this had any influence on our results, we grouped the countries 
in two different panels. None of the panel cointegration tests (Table 7) for either the eight ‘solvent’ 
countries or the six bad (‘insolvent’) performers rejects the null of no cointegration, though.6 While 
we do expect this conclusion for the latter group, it is rather surprising for the former. 
 
ASSUMPTION 2: is there international interdependence? 
Comovements across panel units may inadvertently average out the national cointegration relations 
and therefore invalidate panel tests. In order to test whether countries’ fiscal policies co-fluctuate, 
we repeat for every bilateral pair of countries a cointegration analysis on the fiscal variables of both 
countries. On this six-variable system, we apply the Johansen Max and Trace test and simply 
assume 2 lags. The results for these bi-country systems are reported in Table 8. Only for some 
countries, there are just two cointegration vectors that can be interpreted as the two national 
sustainability conditions.7 But in most cases, there is evidence of a third – and even a fourth – 
cointegration vector. On closer examination, one of these additional vectors seems to be related to 
the cross-country correlation of the business cycle, as reflected in government revenues. The other 
vector seems to relate to comovements in net interest payments, most probably due to some 
common monetary policy setting in the EU. One way to overcome this international cointegration 
is to use cyclically adjusted fiscal policy aggregates. 
 
                                                 
6On the contrary, the group ADF-statistic indicates cointegration for the bad fiscal performers. 
7Overall, the Trace test statistic somewhat prefers a more parsimonious rank. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
Now that fiscal rules in the Stability and Growth Pact have been substantially weakened, the 
no-bailout clause is the central principle guiding fiscal policy making in the EU. Even if 
governments gained some more flexibility in the short run, national fiscal policies are paradoxally 
more closely tied together than before via the long-term budget constraints when bailouts are not an 
implausible scenario anymore. Tests of sustainability on national fiscal policy are less insightful 
then. Rather, the overall sustainability of public finances in monetary union should be tested. The 
main contribution of this paper is to test sustainability for a panel of EU countries, exploiting the 
cointegration between real government revenues, expenditures and net interest payments as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the IGBC to hold. The analysis proceeds on two levels. At 
the national level, sustainability of fiscal policy cannot be accepted for all countries. At the 
European level, panel cointegration tests indicate European fiscal authorities have maintained 
sustainable fiscal policies. However, the basic assumptions underlying the testing strategy may be 
violated. First, there is no evidence for a unique order of cointegration for all countries. Second, 
there are important international links across fiscal policy aggregates. Some solutions have been 
suggested to overcome this problem. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Unit root tests. 
 Real expenditure Real revenues Real net interest payments 
Test
c
 ADF
a
 KPSS
b
 ADF
a
 KPSS
b
 ADF
a
 KPSS
b
 
Country  μ
 
τ
 
 μ
 
τ
 
 μ
 
τ
 
Austria * * * * * *s * 0 * 
Belgium * *s *s * * *s 0 0 0 
Denmark * * * * * *s 0 0 0 
Germany * * * * * *s 0 * 0 
Spain * * * * * *s 0 * *s 
Finland * *s *s * * * *s * *s 
France * * *s * * * 0 * 0 
Great Britain * * *s * * * 0 0 0 
Greece * * *s *s * *s * 0 * 
Ireland *s * * * * *s 0 * 0 
Italy *s * *s * * *s 0 0 * 
Netherlands * * *s * * * 0 * 0 
Portugal * * *s * * *s 0 * * 
Sweden *s * *s * * * 0 0 0 
Note: (a) ADF-test allowing for trend; (b) KPSS test: μ  for level stationarity, τ  for trend stationarity; (c) a * indicates 
the variables is I(1) at 5%, *s indicates a stochastic trend at 5%, ‘0’ means the series is stationary. 
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Table 2. Unit root test on total net lending and public debt ratio. 
 Total net lending ratio Gross debt ratio 
Test
c
 ADF 
a
 KPSS 
b
 ADF 
a
 KPSS 
b
 
Country 
 μ
 
τ
 
 μ
 
τ
 
Austria * * *s * * * 
Belgium * * *s * * * 
Denmark 0 0 0 * 0 * 
Germany 0 * 0 * * 0 
Spain * * * * * 0 
Finland 0 0 0 * * 0 
France 0 * 0 * * 0 
Great Britain 0 0 0 * * * 
Greece * * *s * * * 
Ireland * * * * 0 * 
Italy * * * * * 0 
Netherlands 0 0 *s * * * 
Portugal */0 * * * * * 
Sweden 0 0 0 * * 0 
Note: (a) ADF-test allowing for trend; (b) KPSS test: μ  for level stationarity, τ  for trend stationarity; (c) a * indicates 
the variables is I(1) at 5%, *s indicates a stochastic trend at 5%. 
.
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Table 3. Tests for order of cointegration. 
 Cointegration relation: G t − T t + rtDt−1  
Country Lags 
a
 Max 
b
 Trace 
b
 CONCLUSION 
c
 
Austria 2 2 1 1 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 
Denmark 2 2 2 2 
Germany 2 2 2 2 
Spain 2 1 0 ? 
Finland 2 2 1 1 
France 2 2 1 1 
Great Britain 2 2 2 2 
Greece 2 1 0 ? 
Ireland 2 2 2 2 
Italy 2 2 2 2 
Netherlands 2 0 0 0 
Portugal 2 1 0 ? 
Sweden 2 2 2 2 
Notes: (a) number of lags in system estimation, determined by the Akaike criterion; (b) 
Johansen max and trace test; (c) column entries indicate rank. 
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Table 4. Weak sustainability: implied cointegrating vector a . 
Country G t
 
T t
 
rtDt−1
 
Austria 1.000 -0.850 -1.546 
Belgium 1.000 -0.542 2.532 
Denmark 1.000 -0.681 7.212 
Germany 1.000 -0.834 -2.325 
Spain 1.000 -1.153 1.494 
Finland 1.000 -1.567 7.737 
France 1.000 -0.885 0.122 
Great Britain 1.000 -0.759 -0.560 
Greece 1.000 -0.544 -1.394 
Ireland 1.000 -0.613 1.070 
Italy 1.000 -0.634 -6.272 
Netherlands 1.000 -0.710 0.802 
Portugal 1.000 -1.140 1.593 
Sweden 1.000 -0.836 3.524 
Note: (a) constant not reported. 
  
 
Institut  de Recerca en Economia Aplicada 2007                                                         Documents de Treball  2007/02, 24 pages 
 
20 
 
Table 5. Levin-Lin and Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root tests. 
Levin-Lin IPS 
Test 
a
 
rho t-rho ADF ADF 
Real expenditure 0.493 -0.428 0.680 -0.044 
Real revenues 2.583 0.698 1.139 0.730 
Real net interest payments -6.870*** -2.332** -0.751 -1.947* 
Note: (a) *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
 
Table 6. Pedroni panel cointegration tests: test statistics from Pedroni (1999). 
Full panel (14 countries): sample period 1970-2001 
panel v-stat a  2.15** 
panel rho-stat -2.24** 
panel PP-stat -3.73*** 
panel ADF-stat -0.44 
group rho-stat -2.06** 
group PP-stat -5.24*** 
group ADF-stat -2.48** 
Note: (a) *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
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Table 7. Pedroni panel cointegration tests: test statistics from Pedroni (1999). 
Countries grouped to cointegration G t − T t + rt−1Dt−1  
Panel  
(AUT, DEU, DNK, FIN, GBR, IRE, ITA, SWE) 
Panel 
(BEL, ESP, FRA, GRC, NLD, PRT) 
panel v-stat 1.51 panel v-stat -1.06 
panel rho-stat 0.32 panel rho-stat 0.24 
panel PP-stat -0.14 panel PP-stat -0.62 
panel ADF-stat 1.39 panel ADF-stat -0.72 
group rho-stat 0.94 group rho-stat 0.13 
group PP-stat -0.05 group PP-stat -1.36 
group ADF-stat 0.96 group ADF-stat -2.16** 
    
Countries grouped to non-stationary net lending 
Panel  
(DEU, FIN, FRA, GBR, NLD, SWE) 
Panel  
(AUT, BEL, ESP, GRC, IRE, ITA, PRT) 
panel v-stat -0.40 panel v-stat 0.50 
panel rho-stat 0.29 panel rho-stat 0.45 
panel PP-stat -0.12 panel PP-stat -0.56 
panel ADF-stat 0.53 panel ADF-stat 1.45 
group rho-stat 0.89 group rho-stat 0.40 
group PP-stat 0.25 group PP-stat -0.90 
group ADF-stat -0.02 group ADF-stat 0.36 
Note: (a) *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 5%, * at 10%. 
  
 
Institut  de Recerca en Economia Aplicada 2007                                                         Documents de Treball  2007/02, 24 pages 
 
22 
 
Table 8. An analysis of bilateral international cointegration a . 
 AUT BEL DEU ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC IRE ITA NLD PRT SWE 
AUT - 2/2 4/3 3/2 4/3 1/1 4/4 3/3 4/3 4/3 3/1 2/2 2/2 
BEL  - 3/3 4/4 4/3 2/1 4/3 4/3 3/3 4/3 3/2 3/2 3/2 
DEU   - 3/1 3/2 3/3 3/2 4/3 3/2 3/3 5/4 2/1 3/3 
ESP    - 4/3 4/3 3/3 4/4 4/5 3/2 3/2 4/1 3/2 
FIN     - 3/2 4/4 4/3 4/4 5/5 2/1 3/2 3/2 
FRA      - 3/2 3/2 5/5 4/3 3/2 4/2 4/3 
GBR       - 5/5 5/5 5/4 3/1 4/3 4/3 
GRC        - 4/5 4/3 3/2 3/2 4/4 
IRE         - 4/3 5/4 3/2 5/5 
ITA          - 3/3 2/2 4/5 
NLD           - 3/3 4/3 
PRT            - 3/1 
SWE             - 
Note: (a) entries indicate cointegrating rank on bilateral system by Johansen Max and Trace test respectively (at 10%). 
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FIGURES 
 
Fig. 1a.  General government gross public debt (% of GDP) 
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Fig. 1b. General government gross public debt (% of GDP) 
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Fig. 2c.  General government gross public debt (% of GDP) 
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